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ABSTRACT
In the past several years, many FINRA arbitration cases have been
filed against Morgan Keegan, a regional investment firm. The cases
are heard in a small number of locations with relatively small
arbitrator rosters. On February 25, 2010, a Tennessee Chancery
court vacated a FINRA arbitration award against Morgan Keegan
citing the presence of two arbitrators who served on other Morgan
1
Keegan cases involving the same products in the dispute before it.
On March 2, 2010, another court denied the identical motion to
vacate by Morgan Keegan in a separate arbitration where an award
2
was granted against Morgan Keegan.
Responding to the
uncertainty concerning the finality of arbitration awards in such
cases, FINRA has sought to solve the problem by recommending
that parties avail themselves of FINRA rules for challenging
3
arbitrator appointments. Unfortunately, each of the likely players in
such arbitration disputes—investment firms and investors—has
significant incentive problems from the perspective of challenging
arbitrator appointment. This Note argues that FINRA may be more
successful in addressing challenges to arbitration awards by
screening arbitrators to automatically eliminate those who have
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2013; B.B.A., Finance, Macaulay

Honors College (Baruch–CUNY), 2010. For their comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts, the author thanks Professor George Friedman, Seth E. Lipner, and Dale
Ledbetter. The viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are the author’s alone.
1. Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, III, No. W2010-01339-COA-R3CV, 2011
WL 1047717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2011) (opinion withdrawn on denial of
rehearing).
2. Morgan Keegan & Co v. Smythe, III, No. W2010-01339-COA-R3-CV,

2011 WL 5517036 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2011).
3. See Guidance to Parties in Cases Involving Morgan Keegan and the RMK
Bond Funds, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/
SpecialProcedures/P121240 (last visited November 1, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA
Guidance Report].
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presided or are currently presiding over cases involving identical
products and parties.
Part I of this Note summarizes the mechanics of FINRA arbitrator
selections and identifies the methods through which parties may
challenge arbitrator appointment. Part II explores the result of such
challenges in the Morgan Keegan line of cases, reviews the
subsequent impact on FINRA proceedings, and outlines an
alternative “auction rate case” model of screening arbitrators.
Finally, Part III argues for an arbitrator selection system featuring
the automatic screening method based on the “auction rate case”
model as the solution to the basic risk inherent in high volumes of
cases based on singular financial products.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has favored the arbitration
process, particularly in the securities industry, because arbitration
provides an efficient method for settling disputes. Going forward,
arbitration will likely remain the predominant method through which
securities claims are resolved. In response to challenges to arbitration
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practices under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the Supreme Court
has repeatedly described the FAA as establishing “a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”4 and “embod[ying]
[a] national policy favoring arbitration.”5
In 1987, the Court
emphasized that arbitration is a just and expeditious method of resolving
securities claims.6 The Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the
principal purpose of the FAA is to assure contracting parties that the
terms of their private arbitration agreements will be enforced.7 In light
of such legal precedent, the practice of arbitration is here to stay and will
remain a significant force in the realm of securities disputes.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) draws its
power most directly from statutes and a long history of self-regulated
organizations, and should be assessed through the lens of self-regulated
organization policies.8 Despite the efforts of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to curb abuses in the market in the wake
of the market crash of 1929, a regulatory void existed, prompting the
enactment of the Maloney Act in 1938.9 This law amended the
Exchange Act to create a system based upon joint regulation, in which
the task of regulating over-the-counter markets was principally
performed by representative organizations (e.g. investment bankers,
dealers, and brokers) under SEC supervision.10 The Securities and

4. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
5. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011)
(quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Moses
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
6. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding
that arbitration is a valid method of resolving claims under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (holding that arbitration of claims under the Securities Act of 1933 may
similarly be compelled).
7. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
8. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151,
151-52 (2008).
9. See Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About
Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption,
31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 143 (2011); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (2010).
10. See Rohit A. Nafday, From Sense to Nonsense and Back Again: SRO
Immunity, Doctrinal Bait-and-Switch, and a Call for Coherence, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
847, 851 (2010).
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was tasked with exercising appropriate
supervision in the public interest and exercising supplementary powers
of direct regulation when necessary.11 Under this governing system,
regulatory responsibility for the financial sector, historically subject to
governmental control, was transferred to registered national securities
associations representative of the securities industry, with each such
private regulator deemed a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”).12
A principal goal of SROs is to support the efficient and expedient
resolution of securities disputes in order to maintain a functional
investment environment. Under the supervision of the SEC, SROs
regulate trading on stock exchanges and are active in securities
enforcement, policing market activity and broker-dealer misconduct.13
Out of this policing function, FINRA14 evolved from two larger SROs
and currently operates the world’s largest arbitration and mediation
practice for the resolution of disputes between customers and FINRA
members15 (e.g. broker-dealers) and disputes between FINRA members
and their employees.16 As the largest independent regulator for
securities firms doing business in the United States, FINRA is tasked
with market regulation through contract with major U.S. stock markets,
including the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Arca, NYSE Amex,
the NASDAQ Stock Market, and the International Securities
Exchange.17 Accordingly, analysis of FINRA policies and practices

11.
12.

See id.
See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling
Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1075–76
(2005).
13. Broker-dealers are required by the Exchange Act to become members of
FINRA in order to be involved with securities transactions. See 15 U.S.C.A. §
78o(b)(8)-(9).
14. FINRA combined the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(“NASD”) and the member regulatory functions of NYSE Group, Inc. (“NYSE”). See
Karmel, supra note 8, at 151–52.
15. For a list of FINRA member firms, see FINRA List of Members, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/MemberFirms/ListOfMembers/p012908
(last
visited November 1, 2012).
16. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited November 1, 2012).
17. See Christopher W. Cole, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): Is
the Consolidation of NASD and the Regulatory Arm of NYSE A Bull or A Bear for U.S.
Capital Markets?, 76 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 251, 257 (2007).
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must incorporate the broader goal of SROs of supporting an efficient
securities industry.18
Arbitration has become a widespread method used by brokerdealers and customers to resolve disputes and will continue to play a
large role in disputes arising out of the financial crisis.19 Arbitration, as
well as mediation, is the prevalent method of dispute resolution between
customers and brokerage firms because customers need to sign New
Account Agreements to invest with brokerage firms, which are all
FINRA members, and such forms generally includes mandatory
arbitration clauses.20 Even if a customer has not executed an arbitration
agreement, brokers and brokerage firms are obligated to arbitrate
disputes upon customer demand.21 As the financial crisis continues to
ripple through the economy, it is inevitable that investors will seek legal
recourse against the broker-dealers from whom they purchased financial
products.22 Due to the mandatory arbitration clauses in customer

18.
19.

See Dombalagian, supra note 12, at 1075–76.
The global financial crisis began with the inflation of the U.S. housing market
bubble via: (1) government policies of purchasing subprime mortgages and related
mortgage-backed securities in order to encourage home-ownership and affordable
housing; and (2) unscrupulous lending practices. See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial
Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 55 (2011). This
bubble eventually burst in 2007 as a result of financial engineering by which many
financial firms, acting recklessly, took on excessive risk linked to the housing market
and other complex financial products. See id.; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. The financial technology that enabled this
risk to spread included, principally, securitization, but also derivatives. See Gubler,
supra. These risks had been split, repackaged, and widely distributed throughout the
entire economy. Id.
20. See Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth
Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an
Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 622 (2010). Supreme Court
precedent has made it nearly impossible for investors to challenge a mandatory
arbitration clause. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
21. See FINRA RULE 12200, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607; see also Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56
F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that securities broker-dealer was required to arbitrate
dispute under NASD Rule 10301, superseded by FINRA Rule 12200, which requires
broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes with customers if customer so demands).
22. See Bradley J. Bondi, Securities Arbitrations Involving Mortgage-Backed
Securities and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Suitable for Unsuitability
Claims?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 251, 256 (2009) (explaining the various
impacts on investment firms as a result of their activity in subprime mortgage
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agreements in conjunction with the far-reaching impacts of the financial
crisis, FINRA policies will shape the jurisprudential landscape of
securities arbitration for years to come.23
In light of the legislative changes imposed by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
FINRA will likely take on an even greater role. The Dodd-Frank Act,
enacted in July of 2010, directed the SEC to look into the practices of
financial advisers in response to high-profile fraud such as the Bernard
Madoff Ponzi scheme.24 According to the study conducted by the SEC,
the agency needed to address its inability to inspect a sufficient number
of investment advisers on a regular basis.25 In response to this concern,
Representative Spencer Bachus, Chairman of the Committee on
Financial Services, proposed the Investment Adviser Oversight Act of
2011.26 If passed, the Act would create a national investment adviser
association or an SRO for investment advisers.27 FINRA has already
voiced its willingness to assume responsibility for this newly created
SRO, which would regulate investment advisers.28 Therefore, FINRA’s
regulatory role is likely to grow in the near future.

products); see also Suzanne Barlyn, Morgan Keegan Loses $1.95 Mln Auction-Rate
Case, THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/
Legal/News/2012/02_-_February/Morgan_Keegan_loses_$1_95_mln_auctionrate_case/ (describing a recent $1.95 million award by a FINRA panel stemming from
bad investment in complicated financial products that crashed in 2008 when Wall Street
imploded).
23. See 2012 Regulatory & Examination Priorities Letter, FINRA (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p125
492.pdf (highlighting FINRA’s new regulatory and examination priorities for 2012).
24. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
25. See STAFF OF THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER
EXAMINATIONS (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/
914studyfinal.pdf.
26. See Investment Advisor Oversight Act of 2011, H.R. 4624, 112th Cong.
(2012).
27. Id. at 2.
28. See Jesse Hamilton, FINRA ‘Ready’ to Oversee Investment Advisers,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0913/ketchum-says-finra-uniquely-positioned-to-oversee-advisers.html.
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I. ARBITRATOR SELECTION AND CHALLENGE PROCESS
Part I of this Note examines the mechanics of FINRA arbitrations
focusing specifically on how arbitrators are selected. Next, this part
explains some of the requirements FINRA imposes on arbitrators to
decrease the risk of the appearance of bias and increase the rights of
parties to request new arbitrators. Finally, it compares the methods by
which parties may challenge individual arbitrator appointments prior to
and after the initial hearing and bring a judicial challenge of arbitral
awards after the conclusion of arbitration.
A. STARTING AN ARBITRATION
FINRA’s arbitration rules, called the Code of Arbitration
Procedure,29 provide a simplified method for selecting arbitrator
panels.30 The arbitration process begins when an aggrieved party files a
Statement of Claim.31 This written filing is similar to a complaint in a
lawsuit: it states the facts of the dispute including pertinent dates,
names, account numbers, and the request for relief.32 Within forty-five
days of the receipt of the Statement of Claim, respondents, counterrespondents, and cross-respondents must serve each other party with an
answer.33 After a proper filing, the parties are then free to select their
arbitrators from a random computer-generated list34 of proposed FINRA

29. “The Code of Arbitration Procedure (Customer Code) governs arbitrations
between investors and brokers and/or brokerage firms.” A different set of rules, “[t]he
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (Industry Code), governs
arbitrations between or among industry parties.” See Code of Arbitration Procedure,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Rules/CodeofArbitrationPro
cedure/index.htm (last visited November 1, 2012).
30. This arbitration process is delineated in the FINRA Rule Manual. See FINRA
Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=
2403&element_id=607 (last visited November 1, 2012).
31. See Arbitration Process: File a Claim, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Process/FileClaim/index.htm
(last
visited
November 1, 2012).
32. See FINRA RULE 12302.
33. See RULE 12303.
34. FINRA uses the Neutral List Selection System (NLSS) on its MATRICS
computer system to randomly generate lists of arbitrators from FINRA’s arbitrator
rosters who could serve as panel members. See Arbitration Process: Arbitrator
Selection, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/
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arbitrators.35
FINRA provides a report about each arbitrator’s
background (“Disclosure Report”) including the arbitrator’s
employment, education, and training, as well as a list of cases in which
each of the arbitrators has issued a final decision.36 Parties will then
review the information, strike any arbitrators from the lists they do not
want on the panel, and rank the remaining choices.37 After parties have
submitted their ranked lists, FINRA appoints the final arbitration
panel.38
B. STRIKING AND RANKING ARBITRATORS
FINRA allows both sides to an arbitration to remove, or strike,
some candidates from the arbitrator roster without cause, and then rank
the remaining individuals in order of preference.39 The list submitted to
the parties consists of ten arbitrators from each of FINRA’s non-public
roster, public roster, and chairperson roster.40 Each party may strike up
Process/ArbitratorSelection/ (last visited November 1, 2012); see also Anna Lyons,
Voluntary Program to Reduce Extended List Arbitrator Appointments, THE NEUTRAL
CORNER, no. 1, 2012 at 1, 1, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbtors/documents/arbmed/p125884.pdf.
35. See FINRA RULE 12400. For claims of $25,000 or less, FINRA appoints one
arbitrator and the claim will be subject to the simplified arbitration procedures. See
RULE 12401. If the amount of a claim is more than $25,000 but not more than
$100,000, exclusive of interest and expenses, the panel will consist of one arbitrator
unless the parties agree in writing to three arbitrators. Id. The remainder of this
discussion focuses on claims of more than $100,000.
36. See RULES 12400–12405.
37. Upon acceptance to the roster, arbitrators are assigned to one primary hearing
location. FINRA offers seventy-two hearing locations, including at least one in each
state of the United States, one in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and one in London, United
Kingdom. Generally, arbitrators are assigned to the closest in-state hearing location to
their primary residence. When arbitrators complete their training and become active on
the roster, their names will be generated on a random basis and included on arbitrator
lists sent to parties in that primary hearing location. See FINRA Hearing Locations,
FINRA,http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/
BecomeanArbitrator/HearingLocations/index.htm (last visited November 1, 2012).
38. See RULES 12400–12405.
39. RULE 12402(d).
40. A non-public arbitrator is an individual who has ties to the securities industry
as defined by Rule 12100(p). Some examples of relevant ties include having been
associated with, or registered through, a broker/dealer, or registered (or associated with
a firm or person registered) under the Commodity Exchange Act within the past five
years. Other individuals deemed non-public arbitrators include arbitrators who have
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to four arbitrators for any reason; these reasons are generally based on
independent research and arbitrator disclosures.41 After the parties
submit ranked lists, FINRA then creates a separate combined ranked list
for each arbitrator classification.42
Customers43 are provided with additional controls over whether the
final arbitral panel will include public or non-public arbitrators. On
January 31, 2011, the SEC approved a rule change to provide customers
in cases with three arbitrators the option to choose between two panel
selection methods: (1) All-Public Panel or (2) Majority Public Panel.44
A customer may elect the optional All-Public Panel for up to thirty five
days from FINRA’s service of the Statement of Claim.45 Under the AllPublic option, a claimant may elect to strike up to all ten industry
arbitrators.46 If the customer declines to elect a panel selection method
in writing by the thirty-five day deadline, the Majority-Public Panel will
apply, providing for a panel of one chair-qualified public arbitrator, one
public arbitrator, and one non-public arbitrator.47 The Majority-Public

retired after having spent a substantial part of a career engaging in the aforementioned
activities. A public arbitrator, on the other hand, is a non-industry affiliated arbitrator.
See RULE 12100(u).
41. RULE 12403(c)(3)(A).
42. RULE 12403(c)(4).
43. The FINRA Customer Code defines a customer as “not includ[ing] a broker or
dealer.” RULE 12100(i). Without a written agreement to arbitrate, only a customer of a
FINRA member firm may demand arbitration of claims against the firm in a FINRA
arbitration. See RULE 12200. Fortunately for investors, courts have broadly interpreted
the term “customer” despite the vague definition provided by FINRA. This note focuses
on FINRA arbitration cases in which the “customer” status is not in dispute. For a
broader explanation of the “customer” issue in light of the Morgan Keegan line of
cases, see Alexander Ziccardi, Bucking the Trend: A Case for Rejecting an Emerging
Narrow View of Who Qualifies as a Customer in FINRA Arbitration, 19 PIABA B.J. 57
(2012).
44. See RULE 12403; see also Press Release, FINRA, SEC Approves FINRA
Proposal to Give Investors Permanent Option of All Public Arbitration Panels (Feb. 1,
2011), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2011/P122877.
45. See Arbitrator Appointment Frequently Asked Questions, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalRe
sources/FAQ/P123922 (last visited November 1, 2012).
46. Id.
47. See id.
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and All-Public Panel Rules provide customers with significant control
over the composition of a FINRA panel.48
In some circumstances, FINRA must extend the arbitrator list in
order to appoint a final panel, a process that has recently become subject
to greater party control.49 When an appointed arbitrator withdraws or is
removed from a selected panel, FINRA will initially attempt to replace
the arbitrator by consulting the original arbitrator selection list
completed by the parties.50 If a replacement cannot be appointed using
this method, FINRA extends the list in order to appoint a full arbitral
panel.51 Prior to February 1, 2012, extending the list consisted of using
the MATRICS system to generate arbitrators randomly; such arbitrators
could only be challenged for cause, which created many complaints
among parties.52 On February 1, 2012, FINRA began offering a
voluntary short-list option, allowing parties to agree to strike one
arbitrator and rank the remaining arbitrators in order of preference from
a newly-generated list of three potential arbitrators.53 The new short list
option provides yet another method by which parties maintain control
over arbitrator selection.54
C. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
FINRA imposes significant disclosure requirements on its
arbitrators, which provide the basis upon which parties strike and rank
potential panels. Before appointing a final panel, FINRA asks each
potential candidate to make any further disclosures not included in the
Disclosure Report based on information specific to the dispute.55 Under
these additional disclosure requirements, each potential arbitrator must
reasonably learn of and divulge any conditions which would prevent

48. See Press Release, FINRA, SEC Approves FINRA Proposal to Give Investors
Permanent Option of All Public Arbitration Panels (stating that the change greatly
increases investor choice within FINRA Arbitrations Programs).
49. See Lyons, supra note 34 at 1–4.
50. See id. at 2.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1–2.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 4.
55. For a list of the types of disclosures required and for examples, see Arbitrator
Disclosure, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/
Responsibilites/Disclosures/ (last visited November 1, 2012).
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unbiased reasoning and rendering of equitable decisions.56 Such
conditions include red flags like financial or personal interest in the
decision and existing or previous relationships with any party,
representative, or witness.57 In addition, circumstances that are less
clearly bias-producing may also give rise to arbitrator challenge such as
associations involving members of the arbitrator’s family or current
employers, partners, or business associates, as well as present or past
service as a mediator for any party.58
D. CHALLENGING ARBITRATORS (PRE-AWARD)
Under FINRA rules, parties are able to challenge the appointment
of individual arbitrators for cause after the initial striking and ranking
period.59 Alternatively, parties may seek to vacate an award entirely
after arbitration on one of several grounds that resemble for cause
arbitrator challenges, such as “evident partiality.”60
1. Pre-hearing Challenges (Rule 12407(a))
FINRA rules provide parties with an opportunity to challenge the
appointment of arbitrators after the initial striking and ranking period.
Under FINRA Rule 12407(a)(1), a party’s request or motion to remove
an arbitrator may be honored before the first hearing session if based on
pre-motion information, the arbitrator’s bias, lack of impartiality, or
any interest in the outcome of the arbitration may be reasonably
inferred.61 In order to succeed on a removal request, the moving party
must meet the burden of proof by reasonably demonstrating that a
definite interest or bias exists.62 Accordingly, FINRA rules provide
parties with a mechanism by which to ensure the arbitral panel remains
neutral.63

56.
57.

FINRA RULE 12405(a).
See Arbitrator Disclosure, supra note 55 (listing arbitrator disclosure
requirements, which include “any relationship, experience and background information
that may affect-or even appear to affect-the arbitrator’s ability to be impartial”).
58. Id.
59. See RULE 12407(a).
60. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006).
61. RULE 12407(a).
62. Id.
63. See Arbitrator Disclosure, supra note 55.
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2. Post-hearing Challenges (Rule 12407(b))
In order to further ensure the impartiality of arbitrators, FINRA
Rule 12407(b) provides a FINRA Director64 with the discretion to
remove an arbitrator after the first hearing.65 Before appointing an
arbitral panel, a Director will notify potential arbitrators of the type of
the dispute and the identity of the parties.66 Each potential arbitrator
must make reasonable efforts to learn of, and disclose to the Director,
any circumstances that may preclude the rendering an objective and
impartial finding.67 Prior to 2001, the Director’s authority to remove
arbitrators ended after the first hearing or Initial Prehearing
Conference.68 The Customer Code was amended in 2001 to give the
Director the power to remove an arbitrator who did not disclose
information that should have been disclosed under Rule 12405.69 The
rule states that only the Director or President of Dispute Resolution may
exercise this authority when such information is discovered after the
first hearing session or prehearing.70 Principally, the rule allows a party
to challenge an arbitrator who failed to disclose a material relationship.71
In conjunction with Rule 12405, Rule 12407(b) increases the fairness
and efficiency of the arbitration process.72
E. CHALLENGING ARBITRATORS (POST-AWARD)
Once an award has been granted, parties may still have a limited
opportunity for challenging such a verdict on similar grounds as allowed
64. “The term ‘Director’ means the Director of FINRA Dispute Resolution. Unless
[FINRA Rules] provide that the Director may not delegate a specific function, the term
includes FINRA staff to whom the Director has delegated authority.” RULE 12100(k).
65. RULE 12407(b).
66. See RULE 12405(a).
67. For examples of some of the necessary disclosures, see supra Part I.C.
68. See NASD Notice to Members 01-13, SEC Approves Amendments to
Director’s Authority to Remove Arbitrators for Cause 77 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003
916.pdf (announcing the December 8, 2000 SEC approval of amendments providing
authority for the Director of Arbitration to remove arbitrators for cause after hearings
have begun).
69. Id.
70. RULE 12407(b).
71. Id.; see also RULE 12405.
72. RULE 12405.

2012]

FINRA'S ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS

179

under FINRA Rule 12407. The FAA provides the authority for judicial
review to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards.73 To vacate an
award for an arbitrator’s alleged bias, the party seeking vacatur must
show that the arbitrator demonstrated “evident partiality,”74 a term that
has been broadly defined by different circuit courts.
The definition of “evident partiality” has changed several times
since the Supreme Court defined the term in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.75 Where parties have agreed to
arbitrate, judicial review is severely limited and the arbitrator’s
decisions may be set aside only in exceptional situations.76 Most
relevantly, such circumstances include “evident partiality,” defined
originally by a plurality in Commonwealth Coatings as action or
nondisclosure that conveys an appearance or impression of bias.77
Subsequent district courts have adopted varying degrees of the “evident
partiality” standard with some courts merely requiring an impression of
bias while others requiring more than an appearance of bias in order to
vacate an award.78
A review of “evident partiality” jurisprudence reveals a spectrum of
analysis evolving in different circuits marked by two separate standards.
“Evident partiality” in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits (“impression
73.
74.

9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006).
The FAA states in relevant part that “[i]n any of the following cases the United
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . . . (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” Id. § 10.
75. 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
76. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); see also 9
U.S.C. § 10(a) (listing limited grounds, such as fraud and corruption, for vacating
arbitration award).
77. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149
–50 (1968). The court reasoned that because of the combination of: (1) arbitrators
having expansive freedom in their rulings and (2) arbitration awards not being subject
to appellate review, an arbitrator’s impartiality should meet the standards of Article III
judges. The court defined such Article III standards by reference to the American
Arbitration Association as well as the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which call for a judge
to be “careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that
his social or business relations . . . influence[] his judicial conduct.” Id.
78. Compare Crow Constr. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217,
220–21 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (adopting the appearance of bias standard while rejecting the
need for proof of actual bias in order to vacate an arbitration award) with Morelite
Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83–84
(2d Cir. 1984) (finding that in order to vacate an arbitration award under Section 10(b)
there must be something more than the mere appearance of bias).
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circuits”) may be met by a mere impression of bias while the Sixth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits (“actual bias circuits”) require something
more than an appearance of bias in order for a moving party to
successfully vacate an award.79 The Second Circuit, on the other hand,
appears to fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum marked by the
“impression circuits” and the “actual bias circuits.”80 The distinction
between this emerging circuit split is best characterized by the higher
burden imposed by “actual bias circuits,” which treat the simple
appearance of a lack of impartiality as insufficient to upset an arbitral
award.81 Impression circuits, on the other hand, will set aside an arbitral
award in cases where, for example, an arbitrator’s law firm formerly
represented a parent company of one of the claimants, despite the lack
of actual knowledge by the arbitrator of such a fact, or additional
evidence to suggest that the arbitrator acted to the benefit (or detriment)
of any party.82 Courts will likely continue to use various factors for
“evident partiality” analysis.
The trend in New York state courts and the Second Circuit appears
to be a “reasonable person” standard, as recently upheld in U.S.
Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc.83 and Scandinavian
Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.84 In Morelite
Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds, the Second Circuit first declined to follow the opinion of
Commonwealth Coatings, holding that it did not have binding effect
since the Supreme Court’s opinion was a plurality rather than a
79. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994); Middlesex
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982) with Health Servs Mgmt.
Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp.,
879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989); Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140 (10th
Cir. 1982).
80. See Morelite, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984); see also In re Andros Compania
Maritima, S.A. (Marc Rich & Co., A.G.), 579 F.2d 691, 701–02 (2d Cir. 1978)
(refusing to vacate an arbitration award based on a professional relationship between a
challenged arbitrator and the operator of the vessel involved in the arbitration)..
81. See e.g., Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp., 975 F.2d at 1264 (requiring a showing of
more than just an appearance of bias to set aside an award for arbitration partiality).
82. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
because Arbitrator Conrad had constructive knowledge of the presence of a conflict, his
“failure to inform the parties to the arbitration resulted in a reasonable impression of
partiality under Commonwealth Coatings.”).
83. 958 N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 2011).
84. 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2012).
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majority.85 Instead, the court adopted a “reasonable person standard,”
stating that “evident partiality” is present where a reasonable person
would find that an arbitrator was biased in favor one party to the
detriment of another in arbitration.86 U.S. Electronics followed a
plethora of case law from the Second Circuit,87 reasoning that the
stringent “evident partiality” standard could not be satisfied by a mere
appearance of bias even though proof of actual bias is rarely
established.88 Most recently, in Scandinavian Reinsurance Co., the
Second Circuit reaffirmed this standard, holding that where nondisclosure by an arbitrator did not suggest a party suffered bias, then the
mere suggestion of bias did not warrant vacatur.89 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit, as well as New York state courts adopt a “reasonable
person standard” finding that it strikes a proper balance between
threatening private arbitration and upholding the fairness to which
parties are entitled.90
II. MIXED INCENTIVES VERSUS AUCTION RATE MODEL
Part II of this note examines the mixed incentives for FINRA
parties to bring essentially identical claims involving analogous
financial products twice because of the similarity between FINRA Rule
12407 challenges and “evident partiality” claims and the current arbitral
panel selection model. 91 Next, this part explores the current panel
selection model as applied to the Morgan Keegan line of cases and the
threat to arbitration. Finally, it compares the current panel selection
model with a model developed specifically for auction rate cases.
85. See Morelite, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the decision in
Commonwealth Coatings was not binding because four justices did not constitute a
majority of the Supreme Court and the opinion of Justice White, writing for himself and
Justice Marshall, merely concurred in the result).
86. Id. at 84.
87. See, e.g., Ecoline, Inc. v. Local Union No. 12 of Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost
Insulators, 271 Fed. Appx. 70 (2d Cir. 2008); Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar
Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007); Lucent Techs. Inc. v.
Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2004).
88. U.S. Elecs., Inc., 958 N.E.2d at 893.
89. See Scandinavian Reins., 668 F.3d at 73.
90. See Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d 79 at 84 (“In this way, we believe that the
courts may refrain from threatening the valuable role of private arbitration in the
settlement of commercial disputes, and at the same time uphold their responsibility to
ensure that fair treatment is afforded those who come before them.”).
91. See supra Part I.D.

182

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

A. CURRENT MODEL
Whether a court applies the original Commonwealth Coating
“evident partiality” standard or the Second Circuit “reasonable person
standard,” or any other standards mentioned above, the grounds for
challenging an arbitral award are highly similar to FINRA Rule 12407
challenges.92 Under FINRA Rule 12407(a)(1), a party’s request to
remove an arbitrator may be honored before the first hearing session if it
is reasonable to infer, based on information known at the time of the
request, that the arbitrator is biased, lacks impartiality, or has a direct or
indirect interest in the outcome of the arbitration.93 Under any of the
standards articulated by courts in applying the “evident partiality”
standard, a moving party must demonstrate some facts that support an
appearance of bias in addition to possible other factors such as actual
bias or arbitrator non-disclosure of information that would lead a
reasonable person to believe a conflict exists.94 The grounds for vacatur
are analogous in many respects to arbitrator challenges under Rule
12407.95
1. “Evident Partiality” in the Investment Industry (Morgan Keegan)
In light of the close-knit investment industry, a limited number of
arbitrators, and an “evident partiality” standard that is in flux, postaward challenges are likely to be frequent. The likelihood that parties to
trade-specific disputes, such as in the securities industry, may have had
dealings with another arbitrator,96 party, or counsel in the ordinary
92.
93.
94.

See id.
See supra Part I.D.1.
See, e.g., Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing the burden of proof in nondisclosure cases as requiring a lower
threshold than the proof of actual bias required when actual bias is asserted); ANR Coal
Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995));
Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79,
84 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding it nearly impossible to prove actual bias); see also Montez v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The absence of a consensus
on the meaning of ‘evident partiality’ is evidenced by the approaches adopted by the
different circuits.”).
95. See supra Part I.D.
96. There are only a total of 6,430 public and non-public arbitrators. Dispute
Resolution Statistics, FINRA (Sept. 2012), http://www.finra.org/
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course of business, is high.97 In many circuits, a claim of “evident
partiality” cannot rest solely on a per se FINRA rule violation without
some additional requisite facts that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that an actual or potential conflict exists; however, this is not the
case in all jurisdictions.98 As a result, even though prospective
arbitrators have a continuing duty to keep the Disclosure Statement
current, including direct and indirect relationships to any party or their
counsel, a post-award challenge may still be raised.99 Accordingly, an
“evident partiality” claim is more likely to be raised in a securities
dispute, whether meritorious or not, because of the closed-knit nature of
the investment business, limited number of arbitrators,100 and a vague
“evident partiality” standard.101
2. Morgan Keegan
The FINRA arbitration dispute against Morgan Keegan filed by
William Hamilton Smythe III (“Mr. Smythe”) is similar to many other
disputes filed against the firm. Mr. Smythe concluded that Morgan
Keegan had invested his money unsuitably in several funds, specifically
with regards to the RMK family of funds.102 After suffering significant
losses to his accounts as trustee and individual, Mr. Smythe initiated an
arbitration proceeding against Morgan Keegan.103 In accordance with
FINRA rules, the arbitrator selection process resulted in the selection of
a final panel consisting of Arbitrators Buchanan, Katz, and Hill.104
On October 2, 2009, after other Morgan Keegan cases on which
Arbitrators Katz and Hill served were resolved unfavorably to Morgan
Keegan, the firm filed a recusal motion alleging that Arbitrator Katz was
no longer impartial because of both his involvement in the previous
arbitrations and relation to another claimant against Morgan Keegan
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/.
97. See Garfield & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 432
F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1970).
98. See Montez, 260 F.3d at 980.
99. See supra Part I.E.
100. See supra note 91.
101. See generally Kathryn A. Windsor, Comment, Defining Arbitrator Evident
Partiality: The Catch-22 of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
191, 192 (2009).
102. See Morgan Keegan & Co v. Smythe, III, No. W2010-01339-COA-R3-CV,
2011 WL 5517036, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2011).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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arising out of the same investment Fund.105 On October 12, 2009,
Morgan Keegan filed an identical recusal motion based on Arbitrator
Hill’s serving as an arbitrator in the other Morgan Keegan
proceedings.”106 Arbitrators Katz and Hill declined to recuse themselves
from the Arbitral Panel.107 The removal motions were then submitted to
the Director of Arbitration for consideration under FINRA Rule
12410(a)(1), but the Director denied the motions for removal.108
Mr. Smythe’s appeal challenging the trial court’s decision to vacate
the arbitration award and remand to FINRA was denied on the grounds
of jurisdiction, but it still created uncertainty in future FINRA
arbitrations.109 As a threshold matter, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
considered whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr.
Smythe’s appeal.110 The Court concluded that although the FAA applied
to the substantive issues in the case, the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration
Act (“TUAA”) governed the appealability of the trial court’s order.111
Under the TUAA, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.112 Despite not ruling explicitly on the merits of the
issues raised in the appeal as to whether the evidence presented by
Morgan Keegan demonstrated “evident partiality” of arbitrators Hill and
Katz, FINRA released a guidance report on arbitrators serving on
multiple cases involving the same firm.113
B. MORGAN KEEGAN UNCERTAINTY
Morgan Keegan rulings threaten the essential purposes of
arbitration. The purpose of arbitration is to provide an efficient and
speedy mechanism for private dispute settlement.114
Where an

105.
106.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *2. Morgan Keegan “filed a petition in the trial court to vacate the
arbitration award, alleging partiality and bias on the part of two members of the
arbitration panel[,]” resulting in an order vacating the arbitration award. Id. at *1.
107. Id. at *2.
108. Id.
109. See id. at *18; FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 3.
110. Morgan Keegan, 2011 WL 5517036, at *3.
111. Id. at *4.
112. Id. at *18.
113. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 3.
114. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); see also
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (holding that the
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agreement to arbitrate is present, an arbitrator’s decisions should be set
aside only under limited circumstances.115
The geographic
concentration of Morgan Keegan RMK fund cases resulted in numerous
arbitrators being assigned to multiple proceedings, which involved the
same company or fund.116 Based on such a concentration and the
reasoning of the court in Morgan Keegan, parties are more likely to
bring “evident partiality” claims in the future. Accordingly, the ease of
challenging an arbitral award undermines the efficiency of the process.
Furthermore, although Morgan Keegan failed in the Rule 12407
challenge, it simply awaited a final award and went on to make a
successful petition for vacatur under an “evident partiality” theory
largely identical to the FINRA Rule 12407 challenges.117 Morgan
Keegan’s motion to FINRA alleged that Arbitrators Katz and Hill were
biased due to both having served as arbitrators on cases with the same
investments or fund manager in which the panel held against Morgan
Keegan. Specifically, the petition cited that Arbitrator Hill had
previously rendered a judgment for punitive damages in a claim related
to investments in the same fund and Arbitrator Katz had an indirect
financial interest in the claims disposition.118 The trial court adopted the
“reasonable person standard” finding that a reasonable person would
have concluded that Arbitrators Hill and Katz would be perceived as
biased based on evidence of the earlier hearings and conclusions
involving Morgan Keegan.119 Consequently, Morgan Keegan prevailed
on obtaining vacatur of the arbitration award and remand to FINRA by
instituting a post-award action similar to the arbitrator challenges
brought during the selection of the panel.120

sacrifice that arbitration entails in terms of legal precision is recognized and is
implicitly accepted in the initial assumption that certain disputes are arbitrable).
115. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); see also 9
U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (listing limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award,
including fraud and corruption).
116. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 3.
117. Morgan Keegan, 2011 WL 5517036, at *2.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *3.
120. Id.
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C. AUCTION RATE CASE MODEL
FINRA has adopted an alternative form of arbitral panel selection
in auction rate cases.121 In a news release dated August 7, 2008, FINRA
announced that it had established a special process for deciding auction
rate securities (“ARS”) based claims in its arbitration forum.122 Under
this “auction rate model,” qualifying investors would have the option of
having their claims heard by a three-person panel of arbitrators, none of
whom would be affiliated with a firm that recently sold auction rate
securities.123 This new process came as a result of a procedure
developed by FINRA for the SEC settlement with Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. (“Citi”) in one of many ARS settlements arising out of the
ARS crisis.124 The proposed solution provided herein follows this basic
“auction rate model.”
The “auction rate model” has proven to be an efficient method to
provide investors and broker-dealers with a high degree of fairness. As
of August 7, 2008, more than 170 cases involving ARSs were filed in

121. See Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Creates Process for Arbitrations Involving
Auction Rate Securities (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/
NewsReleases/2008/P039025. An auction rate security (“ARS”) is a debt instrument
that is typically sold through a Dutch auction. In a Dutch auction the price of the
offering is set by incorporating all bids to determine the highest price at which the total
offering can be sold. The auction begins with a high asking price, whereby investors
place a bid for the amount they are willing to buy in terms of quantity and price until an
accepted price/quantity combination is reached. Specifically with an ARS, this process
results in an interest rate that will clear the market at the lowest yield possible. The
interest rate is reset periodically at which point investors are generally able to sell their
securities. See Special Arbitration Procedures for Investors Involved in Auction Rate
Securities Regulatory Settlements, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd
Mediation/Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/ARS/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
122. See Press Release, FINRA Creates Process for Arbitrations Involving Auction
Rate Securities, supra note 121.
123. Id.
124. Id. ARSs were often sold as a safe alternative to money-market funds, as
investors could sell their shares at an auction that also determined the rate of interest
they would receive. As the credit crisis deepened, however, these ARS auctions began
to fail. As a result, investors who treated such securities as liquid, based on the advice
of investment companies, found themselves short on available funds. See Gretchen
Morgenson, 3 Firms Are Asked for Data On Auction-Rate Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2008, at C2 (discussing the ARS crisis and the issuance of a subpoena for information
relating to the sales of auction rate shares by Merrill Lynch, UBS Securities, and Banc
of America Investment Services).
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FINRA’s Dispute Resolution forum.125 Individuals who had either
worked for a firm that sold ARSs or themselves sold or supervised the
sale of such securities since January 1, 2005 did not appear on the nonpublic arbitrator lists given to parties in ARS cases.126 According to the
President of FINRA Dispute Resolution at the time, Linda Fienberg,
“[I]n light of the settlement with Citigroup, FINRA believe[d] it [was] a
matter of fairness that all investors with auction rate securities claims,
regardless of the firm involved in the dispute, be handled in this
manner.”127 Accordingly, the “auction rate model” has been adopted by
FINRA in the past because it provided an efficient method by which to
provide investors and broker-dealers with a high degree of fairness.128
III. FINRA GUIDANCE PROPOSAL
FINRA acknowledged the ambiguity caused by the Morgan Keegan
line of cases.129 In response, FINRA opted to advise litigants to follow
current practices of timely challenges.130 The “auction rate model”
proposed hereto is based on an effective procedure previously adopted
by FINRA in limited circumstances. Part III seeks to outline the
weaknesses of FINRA’s current framework. Next, it reintroduces the
“auction rate” model as a means by which FINRA may reduce the
ambiguity and inconsistency developing in securities arbitration.
A. FINRA GUIDANCE
FINRA issued guidance to parties involving Morgan Keegan and
the RMK Bond Funds and changed the Disclosure Report.131 The
FINRA Guidance Report stated that FINRA did not believe that serving
125. See Press Release, FINRA Creates Process for Arbitrations Involving Auction
Rate Securities, supra note 121.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Finalizes ARS Settlements with
Citigroup and UBS, Providing Nearly $30 Billion in Liquidity to Investors (Dec. 11,
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-290.htm (discussing finalized
settlements resolving the SEC’s charges that Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (Citi) and
UBS Securities LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS) misled investors
regarding the liquidity risks associated with ARSs that they underwrote, marketed, and
sold).
128. See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text.
129. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 4.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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on several proceedings concerning the same firm automatically
disqualified an arbitrator from serving on other cases or require removal
on the grounds of bias.132 FINRA further acknowledged that under Rule
12407, it would continue to honor timely challenges to arbitrator
appointments.133 Additionally, FINRA changed the Disclosure Report
sent to parties to reflect cases currently assigned to arbitrators.134 If a
party knew or should have known that an arbitrator was assigned to
other Morgan Keegan RMK fund matters but did not make a timely
challenge to the arbitrator, that challenge will not be accepted later in
the case.135
B. NEW GUIDANCE PROPOSAL
The current jurisprudential landscape creates ambiguity and
inconsistency in securities arbitration. It is certain that disputes between
the investing public and the securities industry will continue and
arbitration will be a part of the resolution process.136 Consistent with the
overall purpose of SROs and arbitration, FINRA’s securities arbitrations
process must offer a fair hearing on the merits by knowledgeable and
impartial arbitrators.137 The existing conditions allow for multiple
challenges to arbitrators under various standards of “evident partiality”
and for various grounds such as serving on multiple panels related to the
same case.138 Though it is not unreasonable that some challenges may
be meritorious, parties are currently able to bring similar claims in
multiple venues and on multiple occasions, undermining the efficiency

132.
133.

Id.
A “timely challenge” is one made promptly after the appointment of the
arbitrator, but before the commencement of the next hearing session. Id. The FINRA
Guidance Report specifically mentioned that timely challenges based on an arbitrator
serving on multiple cases involving the same firm and product have been honored. Id.
134. Disclosure Reports now provide details regarding cases an arbitrator has been
assigned to, including the securities firms and associated persons involved, the date
assigned, and the role of the arbitrator on the panel. See FINRA, SAMPLE ARBITRATOR
DISCLOSURE REPORT (2011), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/
@arbmed/@neutrl/documents/arbmed/p122952.pdf.
135. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 4.
136. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 81 (2008).
137. See id.
138. See supra Parts I.D–E.
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and award certainty of arbitration proceedings.139 In order to avoid this
problem, FINRA’s Neutral List Selection System (“NLSS”) should
automatically exclude arbitrators having served on identical product
cases or identical firm cases within a specified period from the list of
potential arbitrators sent to parties.140 Although this process may
eliminate large groups of qualified professionals because of their
experiences, this relatively simple solution will reaffirm fairness and
efficiency in FINRA securities arbitration.
The downside to a rule that reduces the number of qualified
arbitrators that may be empaneled is outweighed by the increase in the
equity of proceedings. A system of automatically assessing arbitrator
impartiality by rigid criteria discourages many qualified and likely
impartial arbitrators from even applying.141 Furthermore, such a system
unnecessarily eliminates many capable and honest candidates simply
because of their prior work experiences.142 Nevertheless, as has been
noted in many state and federal opinions on arbitral proceedings, it is of
central importance that fairness not merely be found in rulings but also
should be clearly visible throughout the arbitral process.143 Although the
proposed solution may reduce the number of qualifying arbitrators, the
downside to such an outcome is outweighed by the necessity that
FINRA proceedings not only provide equitable awards but also provide
the appearance of fairness.
CONCLUSION
Reading Morgan Keegan in conjunction with U.S. Electronics, Inc.,
it appears that the fundamental goals of arbitration, namely cost
139.
140.

See supra Part II.
A similar model was adopted by FINRA in 2008 for ARS based cases. FINRA
updated its arbitrator biographical information to identify arbitrators who, since January
1, 2005, worked for a firm that sold ARSs or sold or supervised someone who sold such
securities. Non-public arbitrators who, since January 1, 2005, worked for a firm that
sold ARSs or themselves sold or supervised someone who did were barred from serving
on an arbitral panel. See Panel Composition in Auction Rate Arbitration Cases,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/
ARS/P124481 (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
141. See Katsoris, supra note 136, at 80.
142. Id.
143. See generally Pedro Sousa Uva, A Comparative Reflection on Challenge of
Arbitral Awards Through the Lens of the Arbitrator’s Duty of Impartiality and
Independence, 20 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 479, 485 (2009) (quoting R v. Sussex Justices,
(1924) 1 K.B. 256).
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efficiency, expediency, and award certainty will require additional
FINRA guidance or legislative intervention.144 Courts have struggled to
clearly define the standard for when an arbitrator’s appearance of an
undisclosed conflict of interest will warrant the vacating of an
arbitration award.145 Furthermore, as seen in Morgan Keegan, there has
been an increase in parties using the appearance of an arbitrator conflict
to successfully vacate awards after already having raised individual
challenges during the arbitrator selection process.146 In light of the
financial crisis, it is inevitable that multiple arbitrations will be brought
against identical firms and financial products.147 This proposed method
for creating impartial arbitrator panels would effectively resolve some of
the inconsistency found in prior judicial determinations and ensure not
only the rendering of equitable awards but also the appearance of
fairness.

144. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (finding that
parties choose arbitration in order to enjoy the benefits of lower costs, greater efficiency
and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators).
145. See supra Part I.D.
146. See supra Parts II.A.–B.
147. See supra Introduction.

